Abstract. This paper examines the location of duopolists on a tree. Given parametric prices, we first delineate necessary and sufficient conditions for locational Nash equilibria on trees. Given these conditions, we then show that Nash equilibria, provided they exist, can be reached in a repeated sequential relocation process in which both facilities follow short-term profit maximization objectives.
Introduction
Competitive location models were introduced by Hotelling (1929) who studied the price-setting and locational behavior of two duopotists, who compete for a common market in the shape of a line segment. Results of the model and their implications were of immediate interest to economists, geographers, political scientists, marketing reCorrespondence to: H. A. Eiselt searchers, and, more recently, operations researchers. Applications of competitive location models range from brand positioning problems and political positioning to models that examine locations of competing facilities within an industry, such as fast-food chains. The main interest in these models is based on their explanatory power. A survey of competitive location models is provided by Friesz et al. (1988) and a framework and taxonomy is found in Eiselt et al. (1993) . Hakimi (1983) was the first to consider competitive location models on a network and hence bring them to the attention to management scientists. The simplest scenario involves two decision makers who locate a fixed, but not necessarily equal, number of facilities each in some given space. One of the solution concepts for this problem is the Nash equilibrium; a locational arrangement in which neither decision maker has an incentive to unilaterally relocate any of his facilities. Nash equilibria are well studied in economic game theory. In the Iocational context, some aspects of Nash equilibria were investigated by Labb6 and Hakimi (1991) . Two major questions arise when considering Nash equilibria. The first concerns their existence and their uniqueness. In general, the existence of locational Nash equilibria depends highly on the specific model under consideration, thus reaffirming the well-known sensitivity of Hotelling models. As an example, given fixed and equal prices, a locational Nash equilibrium exists on trees, but may not exist on general graphs. Assuming that at least one Nash equilibrium exist, the second question is then: given arbitrary initial locations of the competitors and a set of objectives followed by the duopolists who relocate according to a given set of rules, will they ever reach any one of the equilibria? If this question can be answered in the affirmative for at least on pair of equilibrium locations, we will refer to the equilibria as reachable. Some progress on reachability has been made in the context of voting theory (see, e.g., Tovey 1993) . Hakimi (1990) shows that reachability is guaranteed on trees in the case of fixed and equal prices, given a specific demand allocation rule. Using the same rule, Hakimi shows that in a general graph where facilities are permitted to locate any-where, equilibria may not be reached even if each decision maker locates only one facility and the graph is as simple as a cycle with three vertices. Similarly, he shows that an equilibrium may not even be reachable on a tree network in case one decision maker locates one and the other two facilities. In our research, we investigate the simple case of duopolists who each locate a single facility at a vertex of a tree network, and each facility charges a fixed price. This paper will answer the question whether or not equilibria exist and, if so, if they are reachable. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we state some useful results concerning Nash equilibria along with some basic concepts that are used later in the paper. In Section 3, we then investigate the reachability of equilibria given two facilities that charge fixed, but unequal, prices.
Nash equilibria on trees
In this section we first introduce our basic model. We then restate some useful results on trees and locational Nash equilibria as well as their relations to medians. Consider atree T=(V, E), where V= {v 1, v z ..... v,, } is the set of vertices and E={eij: v i, vi~V } symbolizes the set of undirected edges. By d~j we denote the length of edge e(i in case v i and ~) are connected by an edge, and the length of the (unique) path between v~ and vj in case these two vertices are not connected by an edge. Customers are assumed to be located at the vertices of the tree. Their demands are wi>O V vg~ V which are satisfied by the facility that offers the lowest full price, i.e., mill price plus transport cost. The reason for requiring positive rather than nonnegative weights at the vertices is that allowing zero weights renders the analysis quite messy without providing further insight. Furthermore, without loss of realism we require that I VI > 2. As in many competitive location models, transport costs are assumed to be linear with unit transport cost normalized to one, so that it costs dii dollars to ship one unit from v i to v). Two facilities A and B are assumed to supply customers. The facilities are restricted to locate at vertices of the tree and their current locations are denoted by v a and v B, respectively. The mill prices charged at facilities A and B are PA and PB; since Hakimi (1990) has already dealt with the case of equal prices, we restrict ourselves to unequal prices PA and p~. Without loss of generality let PA <PB. Whenever customers at a vertex v i purchase from facility A, we will say that facility A "captures" v i, a concept first introduced by Stackelberg (1943) and later rediscovered by ReVelle (1986) . Formally, facility A captures all demand at vertex vi, if pA + dAi <PB + dBi. H. A. Eiselt, J. Bhadury: Reachability of locational Nash equilibria
gO (A ) = PA S (A ) and go (B) = PB S ( B), respectively. As prices in this paper are parametric, maximization of go(A) and go(B) is equivalent to maximizing S(A) and S(B).
In this paper, we investigate a process, in which two decision makers sequentially relocate their facilities so as to maximize S(A) and S(B), respectively. This process is repeated until it converges. In particular, we employ three rules in the individual optimization process:
(1) A facility, when given the option to relocate, will do so by maximizing its profit given its opponent's current location. The result is refen'ed to as a (111) medianoid (see, e.g., Hakimi 1983) . Note that this is a short-term view as it pays no attention to the potential reactions of the competing facility.
(2) The facilities move in a sequential manner. The idea is that it takes a certain amount of time for a facility to react to its opponent's action, so that a facility planner has an opportunity to maximize its profit now. (3) Location at the same vertex is prohibited. While this rule sounds somewhat restrictive, there are good reasons for employing it. One reason is that in the case of fixed and unequal prices, if location at the same vertex were allowed, then the less expensive facility could always completely annihilate its opponent by locating at the same vertex. Moreover, due to the discrete nature of space available for location, it is not realistic to assume that facilities can actually co-locate.
In the following we restate a few definitions and lemmas regarding trees which are used in this paper. It is also useful to restate the classical.
Lemma 3 (Goldman 1971 ). A vertex Vq is a median, if and only if w(Tj q) _< ~%,(T), i.e., the largest subtree spanned by vq has a demand that is no more than half of the total market's demand.
Lemma 3 implies immediately

Corollary 4 (Median Location Corollary). For any vertex
Vk e V with w(T~) > ~w(T) the median vqe T(.
We are now able to formally define Nash equilibria. 
